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in our recent restructuring of Phi 10sophia Christi, we set aside the
tradition ofpub lis hing the annual presidential address. Howevel; to bring closure
to the tradition, and with an apology for the delay, we here present the/inal address
that was delivered at our national meeting in November 1998.}

[EDITOR'S NOTE:

To begin, just a word about my topic. I intend this purely as a descriptive assessment of where we are at this point in the discussion of the cosmological argument. I will add nothing new, but so much discussion has
occurred over the last years, especially even the last five, that I think some
summation and agenda-setting might be helpful. That will be my limited
purpose in what follows.
I should add that, due to the overwhelming amount of material, I will
restrict my attention to the traditional fonn of the argument. Particularly, I
will leave to others an assessment of both the Kalaam and Swinburne's
inductive arguments. Nor will I get into the constantly increasing literature
exegeting Thomas.
When I first began writing, it was, significantly, twenty-five years since
the publication of Bruce Reichenbach's The Cosmological Argument (1972).
I think it was this event that marked the beginning of more positive evaluation of the argument within broader philosophical circles. Further encouragement and stimulus came from the appearance, two years later, of N onn
Geisler's Philosophy of Religion (1974). The next year saw the publication
of William Rowe's The Cosmological Argument (1975), the culmination of
several earlier projects. Prior to Reichenbach, the discussion had been
largely negative, mostly based on Kantian-type objections against
Leibniz/Clarke-type arguments. Given the general presuppositionalism, as
well as the standard rejections of Carl Hemy and Gordon Clark, evangelicals were not often on the affinnative side. There were of course among
Christian philosophers some exceptions, like the Catholic Thomists Mascall,
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Maritain, Copleston, Gilson, Owen, Brown, Trethowen, and others. But the
withering barrage from the positivist and analytical camps Flew, Edwards,
Russell, Hampshire, Nielsen, Smart, et aI., - had made it just about impossible to be both an intelligent philosopher and also think that there was
something to the cosmological argument.
In that context, Reichenbach's The Cosmological Argument: A
Reassessment was certainly a courageous book. As he himself notes, the
door had been opened just a crack by the reexamination of Kant's rejection
of the ontological argument by Malcolm, Hartshome, Hick and others.
Certainly, the gauntlet had been laid down by rejections of the cosmological
argument by Alston, Plantinga, and Rowe in the sixties. Nevertheless, to
publish a full-scale defense and restatement of the argument on the metaphysical thin ice of the early seventies still deserves our applause.
Where are we now, at the end of the century? I will divide my remarks
into three topics. First, I will examine the progress of the argument by looking at the major categories of objections. Second, I will look at two CUlTent
restatements and analyses of the argument itself. Finally, some comment on
the significance of the argument is in order. This will then leave us with an
agenda for future work.

A. Issues and Objections
The last thilty years have witnessed a great deal of progress 011 several
issues related to the cosmological argument. To a large extent this has been
dictated by the form of argument that began the discussion. Both
Reichenbach and Rowe were interested in the Leibniz/Clarke version.
Hence, much of the subsequent discussion has been concemed with issues
related to the nature of necessity and the principle of sufficient reason. But
issues related more to the Thomistic argument have been resurgent as well,
especially those unique to the Third Way.

1. Problems with the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Reichenbach (1972) saw the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) as the
linchpin in an argument of his type. The basic outline of a defense of the
PSR had been laid out already in Rowe's (1968, 1970, 1971) earlier ariicles
that later evolved into his own book on the argument (1975). Although there
is no reference to Rowe, Reichenbach develops a similar response to problems with PSR, distinguishing between a strong fom1 and a weak one, and
arguing that the weak form, that there is a sufficient reason for all contingent
beings, is all that is needed for a successful cosmological argument. His
defense is the same as Taylor's (1963), that any attempt to prove it would
have to appeal to considerations less plausible than the principle itself.
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Rowe (1975) notes that a weak PSR has never been proven false. On
the other hand, there is no proof for it, it is not self-evident, and if it is presupposed then it is not !mown to be true. Hence, the cosmological argument,
while not a successful proof, may still be reasonable and hence of some
value to the project of theism.
Several lines of response have developed. Adams (1978) in his review
of Rowe rejects the notion that a strong PSR is fatally circular. If the sufficient reason for there being any positive contingent state of affairs is a free,
hence contingent, decision on God's part, then the conjunction of the general desire and the choice of each individual instance are independent and contingent, and they jointly provide a noncircular explanation.
Smith (1995) argues that Rowe's problem only effects the conjunction
of all possible contingents and not the issue of why there are contingents at
all and offers a way out of circularity.
Rowe (1997) responds to both. To Adams, his response is that the resultant explanation is still contingent and hence part of the conjunction of positive contingent facts and therefore not an explanation, though in the end he
sees a stalemate here since Adams admits its contingency but argues that in
a conjunct explanations can be considered individually. Further, he rejects
the principle that allows Smith to claim non-circularity.
Ross (1980), Van Inwagen (1993) and others have argued that PSR is
false since the second order contingent fact would have to be one of the conjuncts of the huge conjunctive fact of all contingent facts, but could have no
explanation.
Vallicella (1997), however, has responded that one does not need a second order contingent fact at all. The simple list of individual explanations
of each conjunct is sufficient.
To all of this Rowe (1998) has recently responded by noting that none
of this impacts on his weak version of PSR, but leaves the circularity issue
unresolved.
Here clearly the conversation must continue on two fronts: first, is there
still a viable fonn of a strong PSR that does not suffer from circularity, and
second, is the weaker version really strong enough to give us any more than
what Rowe allows, which is clearly too little for the theist?

2. Causality Issues
Several types of objections come under this heading. One is easily dealt
with, and has thankfully all but disappeared from the joumal discussion,
though it seems to live on even in philosophical circles: namely, Hume's
rejection of causal connections which then becomes his refutation of any
causal argument.

286

PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI

As Geisler (1974, 1988) observed, this objection is based on an untenable epistemic atomism. While it was popular with earlier positivists in this
century, it has given way to more subtle though clearly related problems in
the more recent discussion.
Good refutations can, neveliheless, be found in Caputo (1974) and
Campbell (1996). Overall, the best extended treatment of Hume and Kant
in relation to the cosmological argument is found in Hughes (1995).
The successor objection derives more from the Kantian version that
causality resides only in the phenomenal. It appears most notably in Flew
(1966), that explanation and cause are defined as space/time relations and
meaningless outside that context. Matson (1967) makes a similar claim that
space/time causes cannot yield a logically necessary conclusion. Angeles
(1974) argues that by definition a cause is an effect, namely of a prior cause
and therefore any notion of a first cause is contradictOly. And Le Poidevin
(1996) still argues that causes are contingent by definition and thus a
space/time concept. Therefore, if God is necessary he cannot be a cause,
personal or otherwise, and if he is a cause, then he must be contingent.
Hence, whatever the cosmological argument concludes to, it isn't God.
Responses to this objection are really twofold. The objection has some
merit in relation to Leibniz/Clarke, that is, contingency arguments, but it
shows up as the problem of necessary existence and I will deal with that separately.
For Thomistic or first cause arguments, the objection does not apply. As
Koons (1997) remarks, it is simply not relevant to the argument since its
premises use the concept of causality only in a space/time framework, as
does the conclusion; however, there it is negated. Geisler (1974,1988) notes
that this objection fails to understand the whole point of the argument. It
demonstrates that what causes the limits of all other things must itself not be
limited. It does not seek to provide some new concept of causal relatedness.
Interestingly, Smari (1996) aclmowledges that this objection has no
weight for Thomas's arguments. It occurs, he thinks, in the form of
Hawking's idea of a singularity where/when space/time breaks down and
hence there is no need for a creator God. Thomas, he thinks, would simply
respond that this is an argument for a non-space/time explanation.
In sum, it appears to me that most fonns of the objection deserve retirement. There are, of course, issues for arguments that incorporate the concept of necessity in the premises and they will be dealt with below.
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3. The Problem of Bad Science
In this categOlY I want to deal with two specific problems related to science. One is that CUlTent science refutes the cosmological argument, the
other that medieval science fatally damages the premises.
It has been primarily the Kalaam argument that has had to contend with
issues in contemporary science, especially because of its possible implications for a big bang singularity. But there are potential defeaters for the traditional fonn as well.
A good discussion of several such issues is in Koons (1997). He notes
that neither the indeterminism of wave collapse, the Bell inequality theorems or other features of quanh1l11 mechanics pose any threat to a universal
causality premise which typically appears in a cosmological argument. Two
caveats: a causal view in which contingents are detem1ined, that is, necessitated, or one that implies, as some statements ofPSR do, that evelY correlation or co-occurrence can be explained, would nm into some difficulties
with quanh1l11 mechanics as currently understood.
One of the commonplaces in critiques of the argument is the contention
that it depends on antiquated, medieval, or just plain bad science. Best
known, and frequently deferred to, is Kenny's (1969,1979) list of scientific
inaccuracies in the first three ways of Thomas.
Others have picked up this objection, including some theists who accept
other arguments. Adler (1980), for example, argues that the traditional cosmological argument depends on the false medieval view that continuing
existence needs continuing causal action. Wainwright (1988) contends that
ancient and medieval science denies the plausibility of the Thomistic arguments, but that modem versions based on contingency considerations like
Leibniz's and Clarke's, are not touched by this problem. Mackie (1988) also
argues that Thomas's first and second arguments depend too much on antiquated physical theory to be of any interest.
Responses here have been quite uniform. They all make the point that
such objections are irrelevant, celiainly to any Thomistic argument. Davies
(1993) notes that this is a metaphysical argument about causality and in no
way depends on getting the actual science right. Fogelin (1990) responds
specifically to Kenny that examples of "bad science" appear only as illustrations, never in the actual premises. The whole point of the argument is
that science cannot provide satisfying explanations.
This response to Kenny is already in Rowe (1975). Granting that
Thomas may well be guilty of bad astronomy, Rowe argues that belief in a
series of essentially ordered causes responsible for the present existence of
things is entirely a result of metaphysical analysis, not scientific observation.
In effect, then, this type of objection appears to be purely an ad
hominem approach. No one has argued why bad illustrations should affect
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the overall metaphysical analysis of causality in the cosmological argument.
Absent such, I suggest that this objection be put to rest.

4. The Conclusion Is Not God
If Thomas had only come up with a better ending to each of the Five
Ways! I know he meant well, but he created no end of problems. On the
other hand, there really is little excuse for this objection anymore; nevertheless it is quite frequent. The best CUlTent example is Martin (1990) where I
count it three times.
Some rather dramatic versions are like Kaufmann's (1958) claim that
the God of Aquinas's theology is not the God of Job, Moses, or Jesus. More
subtle is Flew's (1966) remark that the idea of God as a logically necessary
being is clearly not a biblical one.
Other examples are not hard to find. Matson (1965) claims that the conclusion of first cause might well just be the big bang. Martin (1990) allows
for the same conclusion to some feature ofthe universe or the universe itself.
Another version is that the conclusion is empty. Le Poidevin (1996)
offers the contention that "first cause" is uninfoDnative. It simply repeats
the assertion that there is a cause, it says nothing about it, and so cannot be
identified with God.
Martin (1990) adds other possibilities. He thinks that the argument
implies nothing about intelligence or knowledge, and especially nothing
related to perfection or goodness. Thus, the conclusion does not get us
beyond natural process, even something evil. For that matter, he alleges that
Reichenbach, in particular, fails to rule out plurality.
Now there is an impOltant issue here, and one that the cosmological
argument shares with all of the others. All too often we see popular versions
that simply overstate the conclusion. Clearly, it is important to the integrity
of this and all of the theistic arguments that one, first, be very precise as to
the actual content of the conclusion, and, second, be very clear to separate
extensions of the conclusion as further arguments or implications.
Those points have been the common response to the above objection.
Geisler (1974, 1988) notes that the conclusion of the argument is the simple
existence of an uncaused cause. At the same time, this concept can be
extended by argument to demonstrate singularity, immateriality, simplicity,
and infinity. In tum, these concepts can be extended to imply more specific attributes of God.
Shepherd (1975), whose Shldy of the argument I think is both one of the
finest and also most neglected, concludes to a CEB ... a cosmos-explainingbeing. Nothing more. But then he shows how to derive by further argument
properties like perfection and creatorlsustainer.
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Kretzmann (1996) in a study of an often overlooked version of the argument in the Summa contra Gentiles simply refers to the conclusion as alpha,
but notes how Thomas carefully and properly extends the discussion to
include important and identifying properties of God.
I need to mention one related objection. Both Flew (1966) and Gale
(1991) argue that the first cause conclusion implies that God is the cause of
evil. In fact, for Gale, this becomes the conclusive reason for rejecting any
cosmological argument. Gale's study is an extremely valuable addition to
the literature that has not gotten enough attention. Several reviewers have
examined other features of the Shldy (Helm, 1993 and Jeffrey, 1996), but not
his discussion of the cosmological argument. Having worked his way
around many objections, including Rowe's and Edwards's, to three apparently sound versions, he then proceeds to argue that all three have impossible conclusions since each refers to an unsurpassably great being. This conclusion would involve its being maximally excellent in a moral sense, but in
the section on the problem of evil he had already concluded that such a being
is logically impossible given certain evil properties of the world. I
I will not comment on this issue further except to note that Gale's objection is not intemal to the cosmological argument. But then that appears to
be true of all such "the-conclusion-isn't-God" objections. While they
remind us to be cautious about overstating the conclusion and also to point
out the appropriate role of a cosmological argument in a cumulative case,
they have no bearing as such on the soundness of the argument.

5. The Problem of Uncaused Contingents
As I understand the logic of the Thomistic argument the concept of
necessity is derived not in the opening premises from its possibility, but as
an extension of the conclusion based on its uncaused nature. As a result, a
great deal hinges on the issue of whether there could be a contingent being
that is uncaused. If so, then the conclusion to an uncaused cause in a series
of causes gets us nowhere.
Craighead (1975), in his rejoinder to Reichenbach (1972), asserts that a
causeless contingent is possible. It is possible because it is conceivable.

I In several publications subsequent to the writing of this article. Gale has accepted a combination cosmological/teleological argument for a finite God that bypasses the objection trom
evil. See. for instance, "A New Argument for the Existence of God: One that Works, Well, Sort
Of' in The Rationality 0/ Theism. edited Godehard BrUntrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1999).
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Mackie (1988) has a similar assessment. He claims that the principle
that "nothing comes from nothing" is clearly not a priori and that therefore
the existence of an uncaused being is perfectly conceivable.
I find Shepherd (1975) especially helpful on this issue. He provides an
extended discussion of the various definitions of contingency, noting that in
the argument it functions not as a property of propositions but of existents.
He finds five components: (1) dependence on God; (2) dependence on other
existents; (3) transience; (4) lack of ontological self-sufficiency; and (5)
capacity to arouse a sense of ontological shock. It is the last one, our intellectual need to seek a final explanation of the very existence of a universe
at all, he labels "world-contingency," which he develops and defends, especially against Nielsen's charge that this is only a culturally conditioned,
emotional response. All of this converges on the idea that "necessity"
refers to the property of self-sufficiency: the lack of needing explanation.
Hence, the cosmological argument simply demands that there be a worldexplaining but itself unexplained existent. An uncaused contingent is therefore contradictory.
Reichenbach (1975), in his response to Craighead (1975), noted that the
assertion that a causeless contingent is conceivable is empty. Craighead
gives no argument beyond the purely psychological claim. I can, in some
sense, conceive of round squares, but that is no argument for the actual possibility of such existents. I would add that I see nothing more in Mackie's
(1988) Humean argument either. Some notion of psychological conceivability is simply inelevant to questions of achlal possibility.
Nonis Clarke (1988) provides a good treatment of the argument that a
being which is self-sufficient for its own existence must therefore be infinite
along the lines that it would otherwise have to both exist and not exist at the
same time. Thus, the concept of a causeless contingent, again, is contradictory.
Davis (1997) notes that it is possible that there be an everlasting contingent but not a causeless one. It is everlasting because God causes it
always to exist. He concludes, "I cannot imagine a possible scenario in
which there exists no necessary being and there does exist an everlasting
contingent being."
Some of this issue may well be concephlal and Adler (1980) reminds us
that contingent is a radical notion. A contingent existent that ceases to be
does not transmutate into some other mode of existence. Its ceasing to be,
that is, its ontological dependency, is replaced by absolutely nothing at all.
This is an important pari of the argument, especially the Thomistic version. Without it, the conclusion to an uncaused cause may leave us with no
more than an unexplained contingent, say a big bang or perhaps etemal matter. Though we should note that in first cause arguments it effects only the
extension of the conclusion and is not an objection to the argument itself.

W.
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For contingency arguments like Reichenbach's it uncouples the intemal
move from contingent existents to necessary existent and so is far more crucial.
My judgment is that so far no one has brought forward a viable form of
this objection and that theistic responses have been sufficient. Neveliheless,
this is a difficult metaphysical issue that deserves continued scmtiny.

6. Existence as a Predicate
While this issue is normally relegated to discussions of the ontological
argument, Kenny (1979) alleges that it affects the cosmological argument as
well. It is, he argues, a property so thin and so vague that it is largely uninteresting. Hence, it invalidates the argument. There can be arguments only
in reference to the relation of propeliies to a thing, not that something just
"is,"

The discussion in Hughes (1995) is most relevant here. The velY
premise of his study is that one must clarify the concept of existence before
one can move on to the extensions ofthe cosmological argument such as singularity and simplicity.
Existence as the propeliy relevant to the cosmological argument is the
capacity to enter into causal relations. This is certainly not an uninteresting
property. It distinguishes for example between the number two and the
Eiffel Tower. If one adds modal qualifiers like contingent and necessary,
one has even more interesting properties. Necessary existence, for example, can be defined as the property of being "unable to cease to be capable
of entering into causal relations."
It seems clear to me that Kenny and others are simply wrong here to
think that "is" can function only as an empty tenl1 between subjects and
predicates. It can also indicate an interesting property.

7. Are Infinite Regresses Possible?
The real cmx of the first cause argument is the denial of an infinite
regress of dependent causes of existence. This factor is what forces the conclusion to an existent which is not itself the effect of any cause. So if it hlms
out that the appropriate type of infinite regress is possible there will be no
inference to a first cause.
Contingency arguments also depend on a kind of denial of infinite
regress, namely of sufficient reasons. Here it must be shown that no conjunction, combination, or set of contingents, even if infinite, would provide
a tmly and ultimate sufficient reason.
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Now this is an old objection, often stated simplistically as the obvious
truth that, since there is an infinity of cardinal numbers, it is easy to conceptualize an infinitely long series of causes, as, for example, in Nielsen
(1971).
More recent claims have been more sophisticated, like Mariin (1990) or
Mackie (1982), and include at least the element of dependent causes. The
most detailed is Conway (1983). Even Swinbume (1979, 1991) and Davis
(1997) think that Thomas's argument fails here. It is this "completist fallacy" that leads Swinbume to an inductive argument based on Leibniz, rather
than a deductive one against an infinite regress.
Frankly, I do not think that any of these have included all of the definitional elements in Thomas's type of series. The classic statement remains
Brown (1966). Other extensive treatments are in Geisler (1975, 1988) and
Sadowsky (1980). A brief but excellent discussion is also in Kretzmaml
(1996).
They have in common an emphasis on taking all of the factors into
account, most impOliant perhaps that Thomas and SCOhlS refer to essentially ordered causes of existence, not change, and this makes an enormous difference.
This is, no doubt, an objection that needs fmiher detailed treatment.
Especially Swinbume's challenge needs direct response. While I do not, in
fact, see anything new there, it may be that fmiher refinement of the argument is needed. But as it is stated, Swinbume's allegation against Aristotle,
Thomas, SCOhlS and Hume seems to me to beg the question. It is an empty
and definitional victory to claim that "full explanations" really are full even
if some factors included in it, though sufficient, themselves are dependent.
Again, I am not convinced that there is anything truly new to be said here,
but further clarificatory work is wananted.

8. The "What Caused God" Issue
The insistence on asking the causal question in reference to God comes
either because of a rejection of all arguments against an infinite regress, as
discussed above, or on the basis of an overstated causal principle.
The latter is a simple enor which theists must take care to avoid. One
cannot affirm simply "everything has a cause" as a premise in the cosmological argument, only to contradict it by a conclusion affinning something
which does not have a cause. Mackie (1982) was right to claim that such
cosmological arguments give us no reason to stop the causal questioning and
hence they have eliminated a need for God up front.
This problem deserves little attention, which is what it has been given.
Koons (1997) notes that by definition necessary beings have no causes.
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Davis (1997) similarly observes that necessary existence clearly includes
beginningless existence and hence the question of a cause makes no sense.
Here I think we clearly have another objection that should be discarded, though not without a caution flag to the theist.

9. Necessary Existence Issues
As we all leamed in our undergraduate history of philosophy class,
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (A 620), reduces the cosmological
argument to the ontological because of its use of the concept of necessary
existence. "The concept of necessity," he argued, "is only to be found in our
reason, as a fonnal condition of thought, it does not allow of being hypostatized as a material condition of existence."
Flew (1968) notes conectly, I think, that this objection applies only to
arguments dependent on the principle of sufficient reason and not to the
Thomistic first cause argument.
Penelhum (1960) provided a typical version of this objection. Arguing
that necessary being is defined as self-explanatory, he observes that nothing
can be explained by reference to itself. Therefore, the very concept is logically impossible.
The most careful statement can be found in Smart (1996). He begins by
distinguishing four meanings of necessary: necessary existence or nondependence; logical necessity; physical necessity (boundary conditions);
and legal necessity, that is, consistency with established laws. Smart argues,
however, that all four reduce to a first-order logical consistency with contextually agreed background assumptions. This is equivalent to interpretability in any non-empty universe. So the kind of necessity for God
called for in the cosmological argument must be a kind of mathematical
necessity. Smart thinks that the theist's best bet is to give mathematics a
Platonic interpretation, despite the fact that its inhlitions do not easily fit current epistemology. This, of course, leaves the theist, at best, with a God who
"exists" in the same way that the number 23 does, which is not likely to give
much comfort to the theologian. In any case, the only meaning of necessary
hlms out to be essentially logical and the argument fails to conclude to anything meaningful for the theist. This is the same view Smart presented in his
essay in the now classic New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955).
The basic response remains Hick's (1960). Others, like Wainwright
(1988), Haldane (1996), and Rowe (1975, 1998), have developed similar
clear concepts of facrual necessity. Swinbume (1979, 1990) argues that
Kant (et al.) is simply wrong. Fachlal necessity is to be defined in tenns of
the confonnity of material bodies to laws of nahlre. It is thus a necessity in
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the things, not a purely conceptual condition, that consists for God in his
being a te11ninus of explanation.
This, of course, remains part of a larger discussion about the nature of
necessity. While I see no convincing argument that necessity can only be the
logical necessity of propositions, it also seems correct that self-explanation,
as Penelhum (1960) contends, is contradictory. But the cosmological argument only needs the concept of a negated contingency: an end to explanation, dependency or causality, itself unexplained. Clearly, work remains on
this possible objection, but, while it provides some challenge to contingency
arguments, it seems irrelevant to first cause arguments.
Smart (1996) admits the coherence of the concept but thinks that such a
being is not God; it might simply be the universe. That is an objection we
have dealt with.

10. Is There a Fallacy of Composition Here?
In my experience perhaps the most frequent objection to all f011ns of the
cosmological argument is that they commit the fallacy of composition, that
is, they attribute to the whole a property of the patis. There are actually two
allegations here. One is a specific logical blunder some find in Thomas's
Third Way, the other is a general fault alleged against all contingency arguments; namely that they infer the contingency of the universe as a whole
from an unvarying contingency of each existent.
Let me begin with the Third Way. Plantinga (1967) claimed that there
was a quantifier mistake in Thomas's move from "everything can fail to
exist at some time" to "everything fails to exist at some time."
Ross (1980) refers to it as an illegitimate reversal of existential and universal quantifiers.
Most often, however, this mistake of Thomas is simply noted as obvious with little care either to demonstrate precisely what the mistake is or to
demonstrate by careful exegesis of the text that Thomas actually commits it.
Martin (1990) is a good example.
Haldane (1996) and Fogelin (1990) are two recent attempts to exonerate Thomas. Both argue that the appearance of temporality in the Third Way
is strictly part of the definition of contingency.
For example, it is impOliant to distinguish Thomas's notion of contingent
from that of the contemporary modal logician. Thomas's concept has te11nination or temporal limitation built in. For Haldane, too, the solution lies in
recognizing that time functions in the Third Way only as pati of the context
of contingency. Since Thomas's argument is not about temporal succession,
it cannot be translated or interpreted as implying a point in the past at which
time nothing existed. This is not a horizontal argument but a vetiical one. So
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the Third Way simply argues that if truly evetything needs to be caused to
exist then nothing would exist. While this is not the easiest or most obvious
reading of Thomas, it certainly fits his pattem more consistently.
The other locus of an alleged fallacy of composition is in contingency
arguments that refer to the universe as a whole. Angeles (1974) and Martin
(1990) are typical examples of recent claims that such cosmological arguments illicitly move from the claim that everything has a cause to the claim
that the universe has a cause.
Three points have been made in the recent literature. The first is Davis'
(1997) reminder that the problem is bypassed by not referring to the universe
as a whole. None ofthe Thomistic arguments, for example, make this move.
Second, Miller (1995) points out that the fallacy of composition is an
info11nal or material fallacy, not a f011nal one. That is, it has to be assessed
on a case by case basis as noted by Rowe (1962) and Reichenbach (1972).
The problem here is that no one has identified a decision procedure for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate conclusions from parts to whole.
Think of a picture puzzle in which every piece is triangular. Can one conclude that the whole puzzle is triangular? Clearly not. But if each piece is
red, then surely the whole is red also. But why shape functions differently
from color, and what a general decision procedure would look like has yet
to be dete11nined.
Nevertheless, conclusions from parts to whole clearly are sometimes
legitimate. Thus one way to defend the cosmological argument is to argue
that contingency or modality in general operates like color, not shape, as
Miller (1995), Adler (1980) and others have done. This seems convincing,
but would celiainly be stronger if a general decision protocol were available.
A third tactic is to argue directly for the contingency of the whole.
Koons (1997) for example does so, as does Wainwright (1988). Typically,
this involves arguing for the need of an explanation that there is a universe
at all, rather than constructing a conjunction of all of its parts. This bypasses Edwards's (1959) now famous Eskimo analogy, and is, in general, a simpler and less vulnerable approach.

B. New Forms of the Argument
One of the difficulties in assessing the cosmological argument is that the
new versions of the argument in the twentieth century have been about as
frequent as the authors who have written about it. Even those configuring
specific historical versions have almost invariably, like Mackie (1982) or
Martin (1990), provided their own restatements of them. Usually, these new
wordings are attempts to avoid a specific objection or to bring out a patiicular failure.
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I want here to comment briefly on two recent additions to the discussion. In a way, they represent the cutting edge of the CUlTent debate, with
celiain new advances and other niceties built in.
l. Robert Koons' (1997) article in the American Philosophical Quarter(v
is a good example of using the CUlTent state of developments in logic as well
as the pitfalls identified in the recent discussion and applying them to the
Aristotelian/Thomistic argument based on contingency. It reads as follows:
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Therefore
(5): It is reasonable to believe that there is a neceSSalY being.
The principle here is PPE: Given that (i) there is a possible explanation
of the fact that F (here: that there are contingent beings) and (ii) any possible explanation of the fact that F entails P (here: there is a neceSSalY being),
it is reasonable to believe that P.
This argument does, as claimed, have the advantage of not relying on
any fonn of PSR. It is not neceSSalY to have the argument that all or any
contingent facts have an explanation, including the fact that there are contingent beings. It only proposes such an explanation.
As the authors note, this argument fails if there is some tmth that makes
(1) false. This may be a serious defect, since it may be open to an objection
like Gale's use of the problem of evil.
Premise (3) is, in fact, as I see it, a fonn of the denial of infinite regress
and is open to possible objections from that comer, though this hardly seems
critical.
What will need most careful consideration is just how far PPE actually
gets us. This is a version of a "best possible explanation" argument, and in
this case not only are there rival candidates, one of them is that there just is
no explanation. But, of course, in the face of possible explanations it is
always reasonable to believe that there is one.
This is not the place for fmiher discussion of this argument, suffice it to
say that it needs sustained analysis and critique, especially on the use of the
principle of explanation for a neceSSalY being.

(1) All the parts of a necessary fact are themselves neceSSaly.
(2) EvelY contingent fact has a wholly contingent part.
(3) If there are any contingent facts, C is a wholly contingent fact.
(4) If there are any contingent facts, C has a cause.
(5) EvelY contingent fact overlaps C.
Therefore
(6): If there are any contingent facts, then C has a cause that is a
necessary fact.
This argument works for any contingent facts, even one, such as the
cosmos, and so bypasses composition issues. It is still susceptible to identification problems, but Koons includes an excellent development of corollaries that follow the traditional lines.
The weak points are, first, its use of modalities, but Koons develops a
standard modal logic supplemented by a calculus of individuals that is hardly controversial. Second, it does assume an equivalent of the denial of an
infinite regress, in the form of the claim (or axiom) that any non-empty set
of facts can be aggregated into a single fact, a totality of all contingent facts.
Third, it assumes a principle of the universality of causality in order to
devise (4). Koons argues that it is empirically supported and that its denial
would be radical skepticism. Thus, it is somewhat vulnerable but along lines
that have strong support.
2. Bemard Katz and Elmar Kremer (1997), in Faith alld Philosophy,
provide a version of Clarke's argument that replaces the principle of sufficient reason with an epistemic principle of explanation. It mns as follows:

C. The Significance of the Argument
Much, I would argue is at stake here. It is not so much that all of
Christian theology somehow depends solely on the success of the cosmological argument. Neveliheless, the argument pOlirays the relationship
between God and evelything else. And there is, I think, a clear sense in
which if one gets that relationship wrong, there is a great deal else one will
get wrong, even if one does get the nature of God largely right. Thus, there
is a good deal of theology and also science, but especially the relationship
between the two, that is involved.
It is also the case that the philosophical concepts involved in this argument are central, basic, and critical. The nature of being, existence, contingency, necessity, propeliies, finite, infinite, causality, explanation, dependence and many others are intricately connected. The fundamental issues in
metaphysics all playa role in this argument, and it for them. Perhaps, in the
end, one doesn't understand finite and infinite, for example, until one sees

(1) The proposition that there is a unique neceSSalY being who
brought about the existence of evelything other than itself by
willing that the other beings should exist, would, if true,
explain why there are contingent beings.
(2) There is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings.
(3) There is no proposition consistent with the claim that there are
only contingent beings which, iftme, would explain why there
are contingent beings.
(4) Any possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent
beings entails that there is a neceSSalY being.
<
I

•
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their relatedness in this argument. Thus the argument relates us to metaphysical issues as well.
I want only to indicate two matters each in the two areas mentioned
above and point out why the cosmological argument specifically is so crucial and in which directions I see need for further work. Take this as setting
an agenda.
First, the cosmological argument sets parameters and provides basic
concepts for any theology, especially its doctrine of God. At a time when
aspects of God's infinity and necessity are in question, the role of this argument cannot be exaggerated. Catholic philosophers especially have done
outstanding work here, showing how to derive basic attributes of God from
the conclusion of the argument. A good recent example is Blandino (1995).
But for the most part these discussions are heavy with Thomistic language
and conceptions and not easily translated into CUlTent evangelical jargon,
and hence have little influence outside their own circles. Some work has
been done. One of the finest is MOlTis (1991), who develops a "perfect
being" theology dependent in part on the insights of the cosmological argument. Other good, though brief discussions are in Koons (1997), Kretzmaml
(1996), and Kovach (1988). Overall, I think the best thing recently is
Hughes (1995) book The Nature 0.( God, but it is too philosophically intricate to be readable by most theologians. There is much to do here.
A second area is the importance of the argument to our understanding
of science and to the relationship between science and theology. The concept of first cause directly ties the argument to scientific process in ways
that, if it is true, make it impossible to do science at any level without understanding the nature of God. The argument lays out the basis for an understanding of both God's action as initiative of all scientific processes and
events, as well as of how to explain scientific, i.e. causal events as contingent on God. Perhaps most importantly, it tells us how to insist that attributions to God's activity and to ordinary causal sequences are both true. In
doing so, it runs counter to contemporary naturalist science but also to the
strict dichotomies and fideisms fmUld in much of CUlTent evangelical theology and practice, especially in the churches, that insist on two kinds of truth:
religious and scientific.
Moreland (1989) and Ratzsch (1986) are good examples, but we need
much more and we need to see applications to specific scientific and ethical
issues. Much has been done in relation to the teleological argument and it
needs to be done with the cosmological as well. And it needs to be directed
both for the larger scientific community and our generally nahiralistic culhIre, as well as for the evangelical lay community.
Third, and mming to philosophical issues, the cosmological argument is
important because of its relationship to the other theistic arguments, including arguments from experience, joy, need, miracles, and others. Mitchell
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(1973) and Geivett (1997) have made great contributions by developing the
notion of a cumulative case, but ever since Kant we have been gun-shy to
even suggest that there are connections between the arguments. It is not the
concept of necessary being that is presupposed, and that roots, illegitimately, all of the arguments. Rather, the conclusion to a first cause in the cosmological argument provides the combinative element that allows each
argument to contribute different components or properties to a united overall identity that can reasonably be thought to be God.
Since one of the 1110St frequent criticisms of each of the arguments separately is that they do not conclude to something recognizable as God, it is
clear that we must develop more pariicularly their intelTelatedness. In doing
so, the cosmological argument is most crucial since it provides the bedrock
conception of causality or explanation that all others rely on.
Finally, working with this argument relates one to virmally evelY other
philosopher because the scope and depth of concepts it involves are so
extensive. Evelything being done on cause and explanation by philosophers
of science, on modality by metaphysicians, epistemologists, and logicians,
on action, on finite/infinite, on propeliies and nahires, and more, has a bearing on this argument, and vice versa.
So we have an obligation to listen to and be involved in many of these
conversations. It is possible, after all, that some fomls or even all the current ones are beset by some flaws, and some might be fatal. The theist is
only helped by hunting down bad arguments. Having made much progress
in rehiming theism to a position of being a reasonable pariner in the larger
dialogue of philosophy, I urge the members of the Evangelical Philosophical
Society to continue the Kathairesis, the demolition of arguments, with continued - even intensified-commitment.
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